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Abstract
Currently many cellular networks operate using the
Long Term Evolution (LTE) protocol. Therefore, most
mobile subscribers interact with LTE on a daily basis,
and thus are affected by the security standards and
mechanisms it implements. Here, we propose a
vulnerability within the LTE protocol: the mobility
management control signaling, which dictates how a
user equipment (UE) synchronizes with an enhanced
Node-B (eNodeB) to prevent intersymbol interference.
Presented are the implications and the overall effects on
the bit error rate (BER) of falsified signaling which
forces a UE to incorrectly advance or delay its uplink
timing. Specifically, we derive a lower bound on the
BER for UE that is subjected to the aforementioned
signaling. Our simulation results show that a non-zero
BER can be guaranteed regardless of noise conditions.
Finally, we propose encryption of this signaling to
prevent such an attack.

1. Introduction
Exploring and identifying Long Term Evolution
(LTE) denial of service (DoS) methodologies is nothing
new. In essence, the fundamental idea behind a DoS
attack is to prevent a user, or users, from utilizing their
device as it was designed to be used. DoS attacks are
defined by two parameters: the amount of malicious
traffic load generated and the impact of the attack, also
known as the scope of the attack [1]. Here, traffic load
can be thought of as the amount of effort required to
implement the attack and scope is the number of
affected users. One example of a DoS attack is classic
radio jamming. Radio jamming is a deliberate use of
interfering radio signals sent from one or more
transmitters to garble emissions from other transmitters
in order to make them unintelligible at reception [2]. In
this method of DoS, the transmitted signal is subjected
to artificially created noise to disrupt the signal’s
integrity, thereby denying the receiver an exact copy of
the transmitted signal and making the received signal
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useless. The case of classic radio jamming can be
qualified as high traffic load and high scope per the
model presented by [1]. One notable aspect of radio
jamming is that it usually is not used to target individual
user equipment (UE). Radio jamming affects all users in
a given area (i.e., high scope). Basic electromagnetic
theory tells us that the closer a user is to the source of
the jamming transmitter, the more affected they are by
the jamming. However, in general, a malicious actor has
less control over who and what they affect by employing
a radio jamming DoS attack. Also, a radio jamming
attack requires the affected user/users to be close to the
transmitter. As soon as the affected user moves far
enough away from the transmitter, they are no longer
affected by the attack.
In this work we draw attention to a novel method of
DoS in mobility managed networks. The proposed
vulnerability leverages control signaling, normally used
to ensure proper time alignment of UE uplink frames
[3], in order to intentionally create misalignment. The
misaligned uplink frames create intersymbol
interference (ISI) and subsequently increase a UE bit
error rate (BER). The traffic load requirement of this
vulnerability is low, just a single packet containing
falsified control signaling is required. The scope of the
attack is also localized to the recipient of the falsified
control signaling with minimal second-order effects.
The proposed vulnerability is unique in that the physical
signals themselves do not need to be overwhelmed, such
as in classical jamming. Rather it takes advantage of
how the protocol’s structure requires devices to
synchronize with a radio access point, termed enhanced
Node-B (eNodeB) in the LTE protocol. Among other
functions, the eNodeB is responsible for transmitting the
downlink signal, and receiving the uplink signal to and
from the handset (i.e., UE) [4]. This paper investigates
the subject vulnerability given the current status of the
LTE protocol due to its ubiquitous implementation
worldwide. However, we note that the vulnerability is
generally applicable to any wireless network that
implements time division multiple access and mobility
management.
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The contributions of this paper are as follows. First,
we introduce the subject novel vulnerability. Second, we
provide a theoretical lower bound on an affected UE’s
BER. Third, we leverage simulations using the Monte
Carlo technique to complement the analysis and provide
further insight into how a UE might be affected. Finally,
we put forth a proposed amendment to the standard that
would nullify the effect of this vulnerability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
First, we present a review of the salient aspects of LTE.
Next, we introduce the proposed vulnerability and its
theoretical effects. The preceding analysis is then
complemented and further illuminated by the presented
simulated results. Finally, we extend the results with a
discussion of their interpretation in the context of LTEspecific mechanisms such as the cyclic prefix and
various modulation schemes.

2. Background
First, we will motivate the discussion by briefly
discussing some fundamental technologies and theory
that LTE implements. Next, we will discuss how the
UE-eNodeB synchronization process works according
to technical specifications as well as introducing the
mechanism for mobility management. Lastly, we
introduce the proposed vulnerability in detail and
provide a theoretical analysis of its effect.

2.1 Mobility Management in LTE
Modern LTE architecture attempts to optimize
resource efficiency by servicing as many customers as
possible. In order to do that, a working group by the
name of Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
was formed. 3GPP is the governing body of LTE
standards and is responsible for issuing technical
specifications. 3GPP is accountable for dictating how
mechanisms such as mobility management are
implemented.
LTE implements a technology referred to as
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)
where each UE is assigned a resource block
corresponding to a specific frequency and time slot.
Setting the frequency component aside, the width of
each resource block is one millisecond [5]. Because the
computers are required to work with such small units of
time, they must also maintain high levels of timing
accuracy in order to function properly and prevent the
smearing of individual pulses (i.e., symbols) and
subsequently overlaping in time (i.e., ISI) [6]. Because
frames propagate at the speed of light, small changes in
relative distance from one another can have significant

Figure 1: The UE is handed over between each
eNodeB as it enters and exits new service areas.
impacts on the UE-eNodeB synchronization and the
amount of induced ISI.
The designation given to the UE-eNodeB
synchronization process is random access, in which a
UE can request to connect to the network at any time,
thus the use of the terminology random [3]. The
necessity for UE to be synchronized with an eNodeB is
driven by the need for UE to be mobile. As the UE
moves around, it is handed off from one eNodeB to
another as observed in Figure 1. Due to the movement
of the UE, the transmitted symbols take different
amounts of time to get from the UE to the eNodeB. The
time it takes for a bit to traverse the distance from the
UE to the eNodeB depends on the relative distance
between the two. For example, in Figure 1 we can see
that the UE remains mostly on the fringe of service area
1, however by the time it reaches service area 3, it is
much closer to the eNodeB as demonstrated by the
shorter arrow length extending from the transmission
path to the eNodeB. Because the distance between the
transmission path and the eNodeB changes, so too will
the time it takes for the uplink frame to reach the
eNodeB.
This time-domain synchronization is managed by a
specific command element in the control signaling
called the timing advance (TA). In order for the UE to
acquire its initial TA command, it must undergo the
random-access process as specified in [3] and
summarized in [4]. First, the UE transmits (uplink) a
random-access preamble that allows the eNodeB to
approximate the UE timing. Second, based on step 1, the
eNodeB issues a TA to the UE to better adjust the UE
timing. Additionally, the eNodeB assigns time and
frequency resources to the UE. Third, the UE requests
to connect to the network. Last, if necessary, the
eNodeB will resolve any contention between two UE
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Figure 2: Legacy TA command (top) and release
10+ TA (bottom) [3].

Figure 3: True Uplink Symbols and the effect of
tampering with the Timing Advance mechanism.

trying to access the same time-frequency resource.
Otherwise, the eNodeB will grant the UE access to the
network.
Now that the UE is connected to the network, it must
maintain synchronization with the servicing eNodeB to
ensure that its uplink frames are arriving when the
eNodeB is expecting them. The official purpose of the
TA is to control advancing or delaying the uplink
transmission timing to the UE [7]. Recall that our UE is
assigned a specific time slot in the resource block while
the other time slots in the resource block are assigned to
other UEs. Therefore, if transmissions are sent at the
wrong time, they will start to interfere with other frames.
In this case, the frames are out of alignment causing ISI.
Additionally, other users with neighboring frames are
also affected by this misalignment. To rectify this issue,
the eNodeB transmits a TA command to the UE, telling
it when to transmit its frames so that they arrive in the
designated time slot in which the eNodeB expects to
receive them.
Before the structure of the TA is discussed, it is
important to know that the basic unit of time in LTE is
Ts ≈ .33 nanoseconds [8]. The most frequent form of the
TA is a series of eight bits: the first two of which are
used to identify the TA group (TAG), and the last six
correspond to values 0 to 63 as seen in Figure 2. Each
bit represents one unit of time Ts. Using this series of
bits, the UE is told when to transmit its uplink signal.
The actual increment of time the TA represents is
dependent upon the previous timing adjustment, NTA,old.
By normalizing NTA,old to zero, the present timing
adjustment, NTA,new, can vary from -.161 µsec to .137
µsec indicating delaying or advancing the uplink
transmission timing, respectively [7].
The TAG mentioned above is implemented to
manage the UE TA when the UE supports multiple
component carriers (CC), possibly from multiple
servicing cells. In other words, the UE is transmitting
and/or receiving using multiple carriers simultaneously.
In this case, the TA associated with each CC may need

to be different depending on, for example, how many
unique servicing cells there are. Thus, the TAG
delineates which TA is associated with each CC. In the
case of the same servicing cell, there is one TAG
associated with multiple CC. On the other hand, if there
are multiple servicing cells, then there will be multiple
TAGs, each associating a TA to a specific servicing cell
[9].
The legacy TA (used in LTE releases 8 and 9) does
not make use of the first two bits, as seen in Figure 2.
However, in releases 10 through 14, which are
synonymous with LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), the subject
bits are used to indicate the TAG. As customer resource
demand continues to rise and 5G technologies such as
heterogeneous networks start to phase into society, the
TAG is becoming a more important factor in the overall
TA [10].

2.2 Proposed Vulnerability
The proposed vulnerability intentionally induces ISI
by sending a falsified TA command outlined in Figure
2. This disrupts and degrades the ability of the UE to
interface with the larger network, thereby rendering the
user unable to communicate.
The disruptive ISI-inducing command causes the UE
to shift when it transmits its uplink frame as seen in
Figure 3. The result of this shift causes symbols to
interfere with one another.
Furthermore, this vulnerability is user-specific.
During the aforementioned random-access procedure,
the eNodeB assigns the UE a unique identifier used for
signaling purposes called the Cell-Radio Network
Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) [4]. The C-RNTI can be
thought of as a digital address for the UE. Because each
UE in the servicing area of the eNodeB receives all
downlink transmissions from the eNodeB, each UE uses
its assigned C-RNTI to know which signals to pay
attention to and which signals to disregard. Particularly
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Figure 4: Visualization of ISI and its effects on
error rate.
important is that the proposed DoS vulnerability
requires observation of the UE’s random-access
procedure in order to associate the C-RNTI with the UE
[10].
Since this method relies on symbols overlapping one
another, the technique requires an adjacent user’s
symbols to overlap with. Here, the unintended, secondorder effect due to induced ISI is best understood using
Figure 3. Not only will the induced ISI affect an
attacker’s intended target, but it will also have an equal
effect on the second frame.

2.3 Theoretical Degradation in high SNR
Environments
To provide an analysis of the effect of the
vulnerability we consider the standard additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel where the received
signal 𝑟(𝑡) is the original uplink signal 𝑠(𝑡) corrupted
by the effects of Gaussian noise 𝑛(𝑡). That is,

r (t ) = s(t ) + n(t ).

(1)

The uplink signal is a randomly generated series of
bits, modulated via quadrature phase shift keying
(QPSK). QPSK modulation provides for the best-case
scenario in terms of BER. By employing a QPSK
scheme in our study, we give the benefit of the doubt to
the BER results, while still demonstrating the potency
of the vulnerability. Additionally, we are in effect
bounding the lower limit of the BER. By implementing
other modulation schemes, we would expect to observe
even poorer BER behavior.
The AWGN is dependent upon the specified bitenergy-to-noise ratio (Eb/No). Eb/No provides a
measure of the energy per bit relative to the noise floor
[11].

Further, Eb/No is a normalized version of signal-tonoise ratio (SNR), which is used more often when
referring to the digital environment since it allows
comparison of performance across modulation schemes
with different size symbol dictionaries.
To begin our derivation of a lower bound on BER
consider an idealized scenario where 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) (i.e., a
noiseless channel). In this best-case scenario, the
theoretical BER is zero. However, if ISI is introduced
via the proposed vulnerability a minimum BER is
guaranteed which depends on the magnitude of induced
ISI. Utilizing Figure 4 and applying the law of total
probability, we can show that for a noiseless
environment the theoretical symbol error rate (SER) for
a given amount of ISI is

SERTheory =

7n
,
16k

n £ k,

(2)

where 𝑛 is an integer number of symbols experiencing
ISI and 𝑘 is the total number of transmitted symbols. In
Figure 4, we demonstrate the case where the original
transmitted symbol is in the first quadrant (“11”). Then,
another symbol is randomly generated with equal
probability and subsequently added to the original
transmission symbol (i.e. ISI). Through this process, we
now have four possible scenarios, which are indicated
by the numbered circles. The color green indicates no
error, and the color red indicates a symbol error. All
possible scenarios are represented by the total area in the
*+
circles, which is , . The area occupied in red,
-

representing symbol error, is ,. Now, to quantify the
SER, we divide the red area (error) by the total area (all
possible scenarios), and multiply by the magnitude of
.
the symbol overlap ( / ) which results in (2). Clearly,
the case where 𝑛 > 𝑘 is not possible, hence the
associated inequality. The basis of (2) is the noiseless
environment where we assume that every symbol
received is exactly as it was transmitted, due to the low
levels of noise. Additionally, we make the assumption
that the false control signaling which causes the UE to
transmit early or late is properly received. This last
assumption could be relaxed by including a probability
of reception of the malicious packet. However, for a
noiseless environment, the BER is less than or equal to
one-quarter, such that

lim
n ®k

n
1
= .
4k
4

(3)

Therefore, the analysis also shows that the BER is
lower-bounded by (3) regardless of the actual noise
level in the UE-eNodeB channel. Any further
degradation of the BER will be solely a function of 𝑛(𝑡).
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Figure 5: Bit error rate as a function of Eb/No
given a specified number of ISI symbols.

3. Simulation and Results
3.1 Simulation Environment and Parameters
ISI was modeled by randomly generating frame
content and summing the first portion of the true uplink
symbols with the overlapping symbols as seen in red in
Figure 3. The remaining portion of the symbols is
untouched. Finally, after the induced ISI all symbols
were passed through (1). Implementing AWGN allowed
observation of the effects on BER as a function of both
ISI and noise. Finally, 𝑟(𝑡) was compared to 𝑠(𝑡),
allowing calculation of the SER/BER.
During this research, we used a randomly generated
frames of 4096 bits (i.e., 2048 symbols) where ones and
zeros were generated with equal probability. To model
the effects of modifying the signal timing, selected
values of ISI, 𝑛 = [16, 64, 256, 1024, 2048], were
chosen. Each of these values of 𝑛 represents the number
of frame symbols experiencing ISI. Because QPSK is
used, the total frame length is 2048 symbols (i.e., 2 bits
per symbol). Therefore, 𝑛 = 2048 symbols represents
the case where two frames arrive at the eNodeB
simultaneously (i.e., complete ISI). For values larger
than 2048 we would expect that the overall BER start to
decrease since a smaller number of symbols are
affected. By varying the magnitude of induced ISI, 𝑛,
we were able to observe the marginal effects it has on
BER. Additionally, to make the model more realistic,
we included AWGN with levels between -15 dB and 10
dB in 1 dB increments.
The model does not account for coding schemes, the
cyclic prefix, or use of higher-order modulation
schemes. The authors plan to implement these
techniques in future research in order to more

Figure 6: Bit Error Rate as a function of ISI given
a specified Eb/No.
accurately model the effect in modern communication
schemes.

3.2 Results of the Simulation
In Figure 5, we have plotted the results of our
simulation as well as the theoretical instance for zero
ISI. We show the BER behavior as function of
magnitude of induced ISI and Eb/No. First, note that
nearly identical to the theoretical BER is the simulated
case in which we did not implement any ISI. Of note, as
Eb/No approaches zero, the BER performance
converges to the theoretical limit of 0.5. This outcome
suggests that for very noisy environments, noise is the
dominant factor in BER performance. In other words,
depending on the severity of noise in the channel, the
presented DoS vulnerability may have little impact on
BER. This low Eb/No environment is the exact outcome
desired by a radio jamming DoS attack. Excluded are
cases greater than 10 dB because the BER does not vary
significantly with incremental changes of Eb/No for all
values of ISI.
Referring to the left-hand side of Figure 5, one can
see that the grouping of the BER curves is much tighter.
This is due to the signal experiencing a low SNR. In this
region, the true uplink transmission is affected mostly
by noise, however there is a marginal effect due to the
ISI at low Eb/No levels as denoted by the slight,
incremental spacing between the lines. As the Eb/No
value increases, the contours begin to diverge,
indicating that, the BER becomes more dependent on
the magnitude of the ISI.
As Eb/No continues to increase, the graphs heads-in
two distinct directions. In one direction, there is no ISI,
while in the other there exists ISI. In the case of zero ISI,
the BER drops to zero as noise quality increases, while
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Table 1: Simulated Bit Error Rate (BER) vs.
Theoretical BER.
# of ISI
symbols (n)
0
16
64
256
1024
2048

Figure 7: Bit Error Rate limit as a function of ISI
for extremely low levels of noise.
for non-zero ISI values, the BER approaches non-zero
values, confirming that the proposed vulnerability can
guarantee a non-zero BER regardless of the channel
quality.
The vulnerability makes the most significant
difference in the region where Eb/No is greater than 7
dB. Here, the BER curves indicating non-zero ISI
performance begins to behave asymptotically. This is
due to near-perfect reception of symbols not
experiencing ISI while bits being represented with
symbols under ISI are being flipped with probability
one-half.
Moreover, as the number of ISI symbols increases,
the less effect noise has on the overall outcome of the
BER as demonstrated by the relative flatness of the
contours. For example, the line closest to the top of
graph, indicating complete ISI (i.e., entire frame
overlap), has a much flatter contour than the orange line
indicating 16 ISI symbols. In cases where the noise level
is undetermined, larger quantities of ISI symbols can
guarantee a high BER irrespective of noise conditions.
For example, given an ISI symbol magnitude of 2048,
the BER at -15dB is 0.4305, and as the quality of the
noise environment improves, the simulated BER
approaches 0.2500 at 10 dB and greater. On the other
hand, an ISI symbol count of 16 symbols yields a BER
of 0.4004 at -15 dB, and as the noise environment
improves the simulated BER approaches 0.0020 at 10
dB. Therefore, with high ISI little change in BER is
noted over a large change in Eb/No. Alternatively, with
little ISI much larger changes in BER are noted over the
same large range of Eb/No. Therefore, for unknown
channel conditions, high ISI guarantees the most
consistent BER. These results are also shown in Figure
7, but from a different perspective. The theoretical
values of BER, given no ISI are plotted in red asterisks.
Selecting four values of Eb/No allows us to demonstrate

Simulated
BER (%)
0
0.0020
0.0077
0.0311
0.1248
0.2500

Theoretical
BER (%)
0
0.0020
0.0078
0.0312
0.1250
0.2500

the dependency of BER on ISI symbols. Again, given
an ISI magnitude of 2048, the BER does not vary greatly
as demonstrated by the behavior of the contours on the
right-hand side of the graph. However, on the left-hand
side of the graph, where there is no ISI introduced, we
can see the large fluctuation in BER as a result of only
noise. As expected, the greater the noise, the greater the
BER.
Lastly, Table 1 compares the theoretical BER from
(3) to the simulated BER with values rounded to four
decimal places. In every case, the simulated BER
approximately equal to the theoretical BER. Recall from
the analysis that we were able to bound the lower limit
of the BER using (3) for a given number of ISI symbols.
Thus, what the simulation provides, supports the theory.
The reason for the minute discrepancy is that the
simulated results are all subjected to noise, albeit in very
small amounts, while the theoretical values assume no
noise. Complementing Table 1, the results in Figure 7
depict the information in a graphical format to further
highlight this trend. The line represents (3) above and
the theoretical values from Table 1, while the red
asterisks are the simulated values from Table 1. As you
can see, the model very nearly reproduces the theoretical
BER for each value of 𝑛. The actual simulated BER for
zero ISI is 5∙10-6 which the authors approximate in Table
1 as zero.

3.3 Implications for LTE
When considering the implications of the above
simulations in LTE a few key factors are noted. Perhaps
most important is the lack of a cyclic prefix in the
simulation. In order to reduce ISI, the current LTE
standard implements a cyclic prefix to the frame
structure. The cyclic prefix is used to reduce ISI caused
by time dispersion as a result of multiple transmission
paths [12]. Time dispersion occurs when the same signal
is received starting at two different times, potentially
creating a situation where the end of one frame
overwrites the beginning of another frame. Therefore,
the cyclic prefix replicates the end of the frame and
places it at the beginning of the frame [4]. Based on the
purpose of the cyclic prefix, we speculate that the effect
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of ISI will be reduced and BER will drop. We suspect
that there will be a minimum number of ISI symbols
needed to introduce guaranteed levels of BER.
Introducing any ISI less than the minimum may have
little effect at all on the BER. However, more research
needs to be conducted in order to quantify the outcome
and effectiveness of the cyclic prefix.
Lastly, this simulation implemented a QPSK
modulation scheme. Higher-order modulation schemes
are used in LTE and should be considered in future
work. Additionally, simulation of the physical layer can
be extended to include multiplexing, specifically
OFDM. OFDM is unique in that it divides a single
channel into many subchannels so that multiple symbols
are transmitted in parallel [13].

4. Conclusion
This paper has proposed an innovative DoS
technique that simulations show would effectively
generate user-specific ISI, with minimal second-order
effects. Specifically, we have evaluated the current LTE
mobility management climate and demonstrated within
it, a flaw, which is susceptible to exploitation. Due to its
lack of security, the TA mechanism that is intended to
shield against ISI, actually makes it possible to create
intentional uplink signal interference. Additionally,
we’ve shown what the effects on the BER would be
under these circumstances. Furthermore, we’ve
demonstrated the ability of an assured non-zero BER
given any amount of environmental noise. Most
importantly, this deficiency extends beyond LTE and
into the wider scope of technologies implementing
unencrypted time division multiple access control. Here,
we’ve only demonstrated the effects on a narrow portion
of the overall picture.
We submit that relevant governing bodies, such as
3GPP, consider encryption of such signaling. Doing so
would prevent a would-be attacker from crafting a
falsified TA, thereby nullifying this vulnerability.
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